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In Poland, as in the other captive nations, the peoples themselves, nothing the Senator has said alters, or will alter, their basic state of captivity under the reign of the interlocking, though sometimes squabbling, Red syndicate.

Concerning Vietnam, those who have participated in the Captive Nations Week observances have consistently upheld President Johnson's actions in that heated arena of the Cold War. Criticisms have been directed, however, at the scope of his policy there and the implementation of our measures. Vietnam is a sterling example of our unpreparedness in the Cold War—too little and too late, followed as usual by desperate, last-minute recourse to military arms. At present, our situation there has assumed scandalous proportions, and when we are told that we can look forward to a long, drawn-out struggle, this is really the measure of the price facing us for our Cold War negligence in the past, from 1954 on.

The plight of the 17 million captive North Vietnamese will again be highlighted. It is strange, indeed, that few of our leaders ever discuss this troublesome subject. Yet it is crucial to our winning the war in South Vietnam. Canada's diplomat and former representative on the International Control Commission for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Theodore B. Brookley, has significantly pointed out, "Many of the North Vietnamese whom I met expressed the hope that one day the Americans would 'again' liberate them from tyranny and oppression. The previous liberation, in their minds, was from the Japanese." Characterizing the ICC as not only impotent but a "fraud," the Canadian diplomat has revealed how thousands of North Vietnamese had stormed the Canadian delegation's office in the mistaken belief that exit visas could be obtained. Lagging miserably in ways and means of psycho-political warfare, we haven't even begun to scratch the potentialities of the captive North Vietnamese in the war with totalitarian Hanoi, and that largely with free Vietnamese and Korean means in the spirit of "Asia For Free Asians."

Another chief theme of the 1967 Captive Nations Week observance is the fraudulence of the Russian "peaceful" revolution. Moscow and Peking are planning a tremendous propaganda show this coming November, celebrating the 50th anniversary of this tragic event. Though scarcely any Western journalist or commentator surmised it, even the designation of the new USSR space-ship—*Boruz*—is symbolically tied up with the forthcoming propaganda show. The emphasis on the "union" of the USSR will be in the forefront to conceal the captivity and exploitation of the numerous non-Russian nations in that artificial state. The sharp contrast these past 50 years between expansive Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, particularly in the USSR, and the almost complete decolonization process in the Free World should be of basic educational worth to our citizenry.

For those under the powerful Pavlovian influence there will also be the need to stress the anti-anti-communism drive of the Red Syndicate, the deepening reality of the Cold War, and Red economic strategy in the whole East-West trade issue. Those who wishfully think that concepts of captive nations, Red Empire, communist conspiracy and so forth are rigid and deep-frozen representations of thought should begin familiarizing themselves with Red literature. Actually, such people are mental throw-backs to the mid-

exercise. To mention only one, Moscow's *International Affairs* is replete with articles on exploiting "intellectuals," non-Communists, and liberals in the West for the destruction of anti-Communism. The same applies to those who through conditioned reflexes are under the illusion that the Cold War has ended or is on the verge of ending. The illusion itself is a prime product of Moscow's Cold War management, and this at a time when we are deeply steeped in a heated sector of the Cold War, namely Vietnam itself. Last September, *Pravda* summed up the matter this way: "The ways and methods of revolution embrace the whole arsenal of methods in the class struggle... including armed struggle." By class struggle is meant divide and conquer in behalf of ultimate Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist power, and the struggle proliferates with varying intensity on every continent, including our own country.

To facilitate Moscow's world-wide Cold War operations, especially in Vietnam, by liberalizing our trade with its empire borders on psycho-political fancy. The present drive for such liberalization is also a shining example of our Cold War ineptitude, and in the end will result in desperate measures of military intervention, as seen in Vietnam. The matter of trade was brought up time and time again in the fight over the Senate's ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention, which was the first part of a package deal that spoils only a series of American Cold War blunders and losses. It is regrettable that Senator Dirksen, who could have won great distinction in blocking the ratification, now thinks the USSR has made "a new ball game" for the East-West trade issue by signing a pact in March with Red China to step up the flow of war materials to North Vietnam.<sup>10</sup> No, the ball game still is the old one, and it was best shown during the hearings on the Consular Treaty. That episode alone should convince us of the dire need for a full review now of U.S. policy toward the USSR, rather than for us to bounce haphazardly from issue to issue as the winds blow tactically from the East.

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To appreciate how much narrow domestic politics and pressure was exerted on this basic Consular Treaty issue, we can start with the concerned declarations of a lady Senator who charmed her mind at the last capricious moment. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine solemnly declared, "I find it difficult to rationalize making a consular treaty with a nation that is helping the enemy kill American service personnel. This situation is completely contrary to the alleged treaty goal of the development of more friendly relations between the United States and Russia."

Concise and taken alone, this statement points to the three essential aspects of the controversy that had significantly surrounded the issue of the U.S. Senate's ratification of the treaty. These basic aspects are: the poor timing for the treaty's ratification, the acute doubtfulness of its advancing "more friendly relations," and the flagrant misconceptions (e.g., USSR is "Russia") justifying the pressing need for a full and thorough review of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

The treaty could not have been pushed for ratification at a worse conceivable time. Signed on June 1, 1964, the convention had not been put to the test of popular interest and criticism until the summer of 1965 when an attempt was made to railroad it through the Senate for ratification. The attempt failed, but was repeated this past January.

<sup>10</sup> See on pact Karl E. Meyer, "Hanoi's Move In Sino-Soviet Pact Is Cited," *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1967.

numbers of Americans, concerned with the USSR's heavy support of Hanoi's aggression against South Vietnam, demanded at least open hearings on the treaty. The situation in Vietnam was radically different in 1964 than it is now. Americans weren't being killed daily by Russian and other communist arms as they have been in mounting numbers since 1965. In March of this year about 100,000 tons of war supplies were shipped into Haiphong, the chief port of North Vietnam, by Red ships from the USSR and the so-called "independent" satellites of Central Europe.

In contemporary circumstances it was not only difficult, as Senator Smith said, to rationalize Senate consent of this treaty, but it was also irrational to accept a pact which by substantive analysis would guarantee a clear, net psychopolitical advantage to our prime enemy in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam would not last long if Moscow and its Red associates in Eastern Europe were, in the interest of genuine peace, to cut off their flow of critical war supplies to Hanoi. In this ultimate sense of maintaining power in the war, Moscow, rather than Hanoi, is our chief enemy in Vietnam. Well over 80 percent of the high-powered items used by the North Vietnamese totalitarians is furnished by Moscow. Even now, long-range Russian weapons, the 160-mm. rockets, have been provided the Vietcong to intensify the decimation of American lives.

"Subtle" rationalization in support of the treaty and the next step, liberalized trade with the USSR, had gone so far in Washington that it is being argued, "It is not to American advantage to have the flow of Russian aid to Hanoi reduced."<sup>11</sup> The twisted logic of this position is that Hanoi's greater dependence on USSR support as against Red Chinese aid would enable Moscow to influence its compatriot aggressors into peace negotiations. It is small wonder that letters to Senators from citizens across the nation, many of them with loved ones in the war, have ranged in the ratio of 200 to 1 against a treaty with the prime enemy. Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, who was elected to represent his alert constituents, actually boasted of defying a ratio of 7,000 to 46 in opposition to the pact.<sup>12</sup> Despite the feelings of many Republicans in the House of Representatives, this and similar actions in the Senate killed the possibility of making this episode an issue for Republicans in the 1968 Presidential election.<sup>13</sup> Only a 3rd Party candidate can make it a live issue.

Following the open, public hearings on the Consular Treaty, an obviously less "subtle" but further rationalization for Senate consent was the CIA's great desire to have the pact ratified. The new pitch to undecided Senators was the opportunity the treaty would provide for broadened CIA operations in the USSR. This so-called "confidential matter" changed the minds of several legislators as well as a few national leaders who had been previously against ratification. The rationalization only demonstrated how few really had bothered to seek convincing answers to poignant questions and points raised during the public hearings. Of course, a number were motivated to favor the treaty by political considerations far remote from its substantive contents, as next year's presidential elections, the open housing amendment, internal Party problems and the like.

<sup>11</sup> *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1967.  
<sup>12</sup> "Consular Pact Passes 1st Test," *The Evening Star*, March 10, 1967, p. A-5.  
<sup>13</sup> Rep. John M. Ashbrook, "The Consular Convention With The Soviet Union—An Issue for the 1968 Presidential Campaign," *The Congressional Record*, January 26, 1967, p. H705.

<sup>10</sup> Congressman Paul Findley, "Poland: The Myth of the Independent Satellite," *Congressional Record*, January 31, 1967, p. H332.  
<sup>11</sup> Associated Press, New York, February 6, 1967.